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THE FUTURE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN
ILLINOIS
Larry L. Thompson*
The criminal defendant who attempts to assert the insanity
defense in Illinois faces many practical difficulties. Among these
are unclear definitions, few expert witnesses, damaging influ-
ence of lay witnesses, and the burden of raising a reasonable
doubt of sanity before it can become an issue. The author ad-
vances a recommendation that the insanity issue be resolved
after the criminal trial. Such a post-trial hearing would make
the defendant's assertion of insanity easier and would maintain
judicial supervision of the defendant until adjudged sane and
safe.
INTRODUCTION
The law relating to criminal insanity has been debated over the
last twenty years.' Authors, as well as courts, have had difficulty
defining the concept.2 The defendant has been faced with prob-
* Assistant State's Attorney, Cook County, Illinois; J.D., Northwestern University
School of Law. The views and opinions expressed herein are the author's own and do not
necessarily represent those of the State's Attorney or of any state agency. The author
wishes to extend his deep appreciation to the Honorable Marvin E. Aspen, Judge of the
Circuit Court of Cook County.
1. See H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954); Baur, Legal
Responsibility, 57 Nw. L. REV. 12 (1962); Bleechmore, Towards a Rational Theory of
Criminal Responsibility: The Psychopathic Offender, 10 MELB. L. REV. 19 (1975); Lynch,
The Insanity Defense, 55 CI. B. REc. 210 (1974); Wales, Analysis of the Proposal to
'Abolish' the Insanity Defense in S.#1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1976);
Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. UB.
L. 471 (1976); Note, Modern Insanity Tests-Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L. J. 88 (1976).
Many proposals for change have been put forward not only by members of the bar but
also by psychiatrists, psychologists and sociologists. See, e.g., R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE
DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967); Fingarette, Disabilities of Mind and Criminal Responsibil-
ity-A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 236 (1976); Overholser, Criminal Responsibil-
ity: A Psychiatrist's Viewpoint, 48 A.B.A. J. 527 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Overholser].
2. The first famous insanity test was Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843),
which held that the critical question was whether at the time of the act, the defendant
was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act, or if he did know it, that he did not know it was wrong. A
major revolution occurred in 1954 with Judge Bazelon's opinion in Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), which introduced a new "modern" test: an accused
is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or a
mental defect. The District of Columbia Circuit modified the Durham test in McDonald
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lems in raising the defense while the public has felt threatened
by the practical consequence that acquittal of criminal defen-
dants by reason of insanity may permit premature release of dan-
gerous offenders.' This Article discusses the legal and medical
concepts of insanity and the practical and procedural problems
of the insanity defense for the defendant. Finally, a recommenda-
tion is advanced for the future of the insanity defense in Illinois.
The proposal attempts to rectify deficiencies in current Illinois
law by balancing the interest of the defendant in improving the
insanity defense and obtaining needed treatment against the in-
terest of society in providing appropriate treatment for the of-
fender and adequate protection of the public.
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Conflicting Concepts of Insanity
A central problem with the insanity defense in Illinois is the
vagueness of the statutory definition. The Illinois statute4 relieves
a defendant of criminal liability if at the time of the crime a
v. United States, 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (en banc) by defining the terms "mental
disease or defect" to include any abnormal mental condition which substantially affects
mental or emotional processes and substantially impairs behavior controls. Subsequently,
the American Law Institute propounded its own test in the MODEL PENAL CODE §4.01:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not in-
clude an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-
social conduct.
The District of Columbia Circuit adopted the A.L.I. test prospectively in United States
v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Illinois has also embraced a modified form of
the A.L.I. test, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §6-2 (1975).
3. See, e.g., Lyon, The Law on Insanity-Time for Its Own Trial?, Chi. Trib., Oct. 29,
1976, at 1, col. 2; Mabley, Crime, Insanity: Revolving Door, Chi. Trib., Oct. 24, 1976, at
4, col. 1; Nicodemus & Rooney, Agencies Pass the Buck Over Release of a Killer, Chi.
Daily News, Oct. 29, 1976, at 4, col. 1; Judge Asks New Law on Criminally Insane, Chi.
Sun-Times, Oct. 14, 1976, at 38, col. 1.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §6-2 (1975) provides:
(a) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such
conduct, as a result of mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
(b) The terms "mental disease or mental defect" do not include an abnormal-
ity manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
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"mental disease or defect" prevented the defendant from under-
standing the wrongfulness of the conduct or from conforming to
the law. This formulation, which is similar to the ALI Model
Penal Code provision,' encompasses the modern considerations of
psychiatry and also the tests of insanity developed in case law.
The original test, termed the M'Naghten formula,' defined insan-
ity as the defendant's inability to know the act was wrong, thus
negating the possibility of criminal intent. The 1954 decision in
Durham v. United States7 established an alternative approach,
excusing a defendant whose unlawful act was not voluntary but
rather was the product of a mental disease or mental defect.
Thus, the Illinois test for insanity considers both the mens rea
element central to the M'Naghten knowing-right-from-wrong test
and the voluntariness element embodied in the Durham product
test.
The major difficulty in applying the Illinois standard for insan-
ity is defining meaningfully the term "mental disease or defect."
Although the courts commonly rely upon it, reviewing courts in
Illinois have not defined the term.' Case law states only what it
is not? The courts also have held that no particular mental condi-
5. For the text of the A.L.I. provision see note 2 supra.
6. Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). See note 2 supra.
7. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). See note 2 supra.
8. Because the test for insanity is vague, reviewing courts should aid the trial bench
and bar by formulating jury instructions and by defining the statutory test. Yet, as stated
in S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 46 (1966), appellate courts have neglected this responsi-
bility.
The trial record is examined only in cases of appeal after conviction; and it is
in reviewing such cases for errors at the trial that the appellate tribunal can
guide courts in formulating their instructions to the jury and in pouring mean-
ingful content into the artificial tests. That they have in fact not done so was
the complaint of Judge Bazelon in his lectures in the Issac Ray series ...
Id.
Instead, appellate courts consistently have used three methods to avoid substantive
review. They have deferred to the "trier of fact" and have upheld the testimony of lay
witnesses on the sanity of the defendant. See note 30 infra. Also, they have discounted
expert witnesses. See People v. Elliott, 32 Ill.App.3d 654, 336 N.E.2d 146 (5th Dist. 1975)
(the court noted that the experts had not "treated defendant recently and extensively"
and disagreed on the diagnosis); People v. Arnold, 17 Ill.App.3d 746, 308 N.E.2d 261 (1st
Dist. 1974) (such factors as the timing of the examination and who paid the expert's fee
were cited by the court in discounting the testimony of expert witnesses).
9. People v. Miller, 33 Ill.2d 439, 211 N.E.2d 708 (1965) (personality disorders are not
mental disease); People v. Moore, 19 Ill.App.3d 334, 311 N.E.2d 401 (3d Dist. 1974)
(emotional distress is not mental disease).
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tion or status constitutes insanity per se.' 0 Medical experts like-
wise do not define mental disease or defect. The term is absent
from most theoretical, textbook, and clinical literature of the
psychiatric profession." In psychological literature there is nei-
ther a definition of "mental disease," nor a general agreement in
the profession on how to approach one.'2
Psychiatrists have formed three medical diagnostic categories
in dealing with the concept of insanity: psychosis,' 3 personality
disorders'" and neuroses.' 5 Of the three categories, psychiatry gen-
erally has equated only psychosis with criminal insanity.'6 The
10. Various decisions have catalogued mental conditions considered not to be insanity
per se, including: People v. Ford, 39 Ill.2d 318, 235 N.E.2d 576 (1968) (psychosis); People
v. Miller, 33 Ill.2d 439, 211 N.E.2d 708 (1965) (personality disorders); People v. Pugh, 409
I1. 584, 100 N.E.2d 909 (1951) (a sadistic and cruel mind); People v. Howe, 375 Ill. 130,
30 N.E.2d 733 (1940) (prior adjudication of insanity); People v. Parisie, 7 Ill.App.3d 1009,
287 N.E.2d 310 (4th Dist. 1972) (homosexuality); People v. Burress, 1 Ill.App.3d 17, 272
N.E.2d 390 (4th Dist. 1971) (pyromania and irresistable impulse); People v. Conrad, 81
Ill.App.2d 34, 225 N.E.2d 713 (1st Dist. 1967) (amnesia).
11. H. FINGARETrE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 24-26 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as CRIMINAL INSANITY].
12. Id. at 28. But see Wales, Analysis of the Proposal to 'Abolish' the Insanity Defense
in S.#1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 695 (1976). The author of the article
states that the terms "mental defect and mental disease" are medical terms which are
unfamiliar to lawyers who deal in moral-legal terms (mens rea). The terms appear to
belong to neither the medical nor the legal professions.
13. Psychosis is marked by a considerable loss of contact with reality or an extreme
elevation or depression of mood. Psychosis may have either an organic or non-organic
basis. Non-organic psychotic disorders are sometimes known as "functional psychotic
disorders."
14. The term includes the so-called sociopathic personality. The sociopath is generally
characterized by lack of foresight, egocentricity, failure to profit by experience, impulsive-
ness, lack of sympathy, general immaturity, and very little regulatory influence of intellect
upon his behavior.
15. The individual suffering from neuroses is usually in substantial contact with the
environment. The neurotic may realize that he is not well and may suffer from various
phobias or such conditions as kleptomania. Yet, he will not permit himself to indulge in
desires and fantasies as frequently as would the psychotic. Overholser, supra note 1, at
529.
The compulsive neurotic typically exhibits the "irresistible impulse" or "momentary
insanity." This condition which affects the subject's view of reality and will power is
clearly neurotic rather than psychotic. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
488 (2d ed. 1960); H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDERS AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 96 (1954).
16. CRIMINAL INSANITY, supra note 11, at 31.
The psychotic will indulge in impulses and then rationalize his conduct by a gross
distortion in his consciousness of even the most patent norms of the "real world." Because
of this distortion and his inability to correct it, the psychotic will be unable to take the
law rationally into account and will be unable to conform when the law stands in the way
of his psychotic impulses and aims. When no such conflict arises, the psychotic can appear
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other two may be associated with criminal behavior but do not
constitute insanity. A person with a sociopathic personality disor-
der, for instance, may engage in repeated criminal conduct but
will not for that reason be classified as insane by either psychia-
try 7 or the Illinois statutory provision."5 Likewise, most psychia-
trists agree that neurotic conditions should not be classified as
criminal insanity."
The problems caused by the statutory and medical definitions
of insanity become most apparent in jury deliberations. Most
jurors do not understand the medical experts and do not apply
the statutory standard. For example, a study on jurors confronted
with the insanity defense concluded that juries disregarded the
court's instructions and the medical testimony in reaching their
verdicts.20 The study stated: "For most jurors, the defendant's
admission that he knew that what he was doing was wrong proved
that he was guilty and sane."'" Jurors apparently weigh the in-
sanity defense by their own common understanding and experi-
ence. By so doing, they effectively deny to the defendant the
major advantage of the Illinois statutory test, its adaptability to
changes in medical theory.
Any realistic solution to the current problems of applying the
statutory definition of criminal insanity must assign the proper
role to the medical expert, the attorney, and the layman juror and
permit meaningful communication among them. 2 The current
statutory provision does not in practice accomplish its intended
result because juries retain the power to apply the statutory test
of insanity.
quite normal. However, the neurotic is far more susceptible to adequate treatment and
can function normally in society as long as his fantasies are controlled. His ability not to
indulge in fantasies places his intent in a category separate from that of the psychotic.
Overholser, supra note 1, at 529. See also CRIMINAL INSANITY, supra note 11, at 227-32.
17. Overholser, supra note 1, at 529.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §6-2(b) (1975).
19. Overholser, supra note 1, at 529.
20. R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 161 (1967).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court
spoke of the need to improve and permit "three-way communication" among lawyers,
experts, and lay jurors. The court noted that this communication was missing under the
Durham test and it expressed its hope that the A.L.I.'s test would permit more reasonable
communication among them.
19771
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Securing Expert Testimony
Another major problem facing the defendant in asserting the
insanity defense is the practical aspect of securing expert testi-
mony for trial, since the market of available experts is limited.
Few psychiatrists and psychologists are interested in the criminal
insanity area. Also, there is a reluctance to submit to cross-
examination. 3 Where a professional is highly regarded in his own
field and his opinions well respected, cross-examination by a
skilled trial attorney can be a humiliating experience." Such tes-
timony also can be very time consuming and disruptive of private
practice. The expert who interviews a defendant may well have
to wait many months before testifying, at which time the expert
must review the facts and diagnosis. Experience indicates that
the expert may then be hurriedly called to testify only to wait
outside the courtroom for several hours.
The lack of available expert testimony also may be due to the
failure of the courts to provide guidance for the expert on the term
"mental disease or defect."2 This has caused problems with ex-
perts who find themselves unable to communicate with lawyers
and the lay jury.
The high cost of expert testimony is an additional barrier which
may be insuperable. 6 The defendant either must hire an expert
at personal expense or rely on court-appointed experts. Although
Illinois courts may appoint experts for defendants who cannot
afford them, 7 doing so in practice does not remedy the problem.
23. Overholser, supra note 1, at 528-29.
Other differences arise in the analysis of the expert's diagnosis. The psychiatrist finds
it most difficult to give "yes" or "no" answers, and deals with his opinion as a whole. The
law, however, allows the expert to be cross-examined on each individual part of his diagno-
sis. CRIMINAL INSANITY, supra note 11, at 83.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1036-37 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the psychiatrist's testimony is
particularly vulnerable to cross-examination and is easily ridiculed in closing argument).
25. See note 8 supra.
26. While the cost of expert testimony can vary greatly within the medical profession,
a reasonable rate among private psychologists would be $150 to $250 for testing and
interpretation and $250 per half day for testifying. For the private psychiatrist, the fee
would range from $50 to $100 per hour.
Limited access to expert assistance and other problems faced by indigent defendants
asserting the insanity defense are particularly noted in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
27. See, e.g., People v. Clay, 19 Ill.App.3d 296, 299, 311 N.E.2d 384, 386 (2d Dist. 1974)
(no error in denying public funds to "explore the mere possibility of raising insanity as a
[Vol. 26:359
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In the First Judicial District (Cook County), for instance, the
indigent and low income defendant must rely upon the Psychiat-
ric Institute which is affiliated with the Circuit Court. Because
of its use by the prosecution and the defense, the Psychiatric
Institute is as overburdened as the rest of the criminal justice
system and attention given to individual cases may be inade-
quate.
The Lay Witness
Even when adequate expert testimony is presented, its impact
on the jury is subordinate to that of lay witness testimony. Al-
though the lay witness is often overlooked in discussing the insan-
ity defense, lay testimony in practice seems to have greater im-
pact on the jury than the expert witness. The medical expert is
likely to appear detached from the defendant because his contact
with the defendant was brief and was long after the offense. His
detachment, when combined with his use of theoretical and tech-
nical terms, such as psychosis, personality disorders, and neu-
rosis, may detract from his ability effectively to influence the
jury. In contrast, generally, the lay witness observed the defen-
dant at the time of the crime or shortly thereafter 8 and may have
known the defendant for some time. In presenting its case, the
prosecution relies primarily on the lay witness who, rather than
discussing abstract theories, stresses the facts, particularly those
showing normal conduct by the defendant. The prosecution's lay
witness testimony often defeats the defendant's effort to use the
insanity defense, for experience indicates that juries frequently
find a defendant guilty on the strength of lay opinion 9 despite
defense" despite defendant's psychiatric history where there was insufficient showing by
defendant that funds were needed for expert witness who could be "deemed crucial to a
proper defense").
28. The lay witness' personal observations, however, are not confined to the time of the
crime. In fact, lay opinion testimony has been permitted when the observations were made
as late as three and one-half hours after the crime. People v. Lassiter, 133 Ili.App.2d 353,
355, 273 N.E.2d 166, 167 (1st Dist. 1971) (no error to allow the sanity opinion of an
assistant state's attorney who questioned the defendant three and one-half hours after the
crime).
29. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 143-44 (1967). The study on
jurors and the defense of insanity demonstrated that the jury in its deliberations places
particular emphasis upon the facts of the crime and the manner in which the crime was
conducted.
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overwhelming expert testimony of insanity.A" These jury findings
are rarely reversed by appellate courts.
The greater influence of lay opinion over expert testimony is
another indication of the divergence among legal, medical, and
lay conceptions of insanity. The Illinois statutory phrase "mental
disease or mental defect" implies the necessity of expert assess-
ment of the defendant.3' Experts believe that a lay witness is
incapable of rendering such an opinion on the sanity of a defen-
dant because a mentally ill offender may appear normal to the
untrained observer. However, expert testimony is not required at
any stage of a case involving a sanity issue.2 The decisions of lay
jurors seem to be closely related to the testimony of lay witnesses.
Neither expert testimony nor statutory standards appear to have
a major impact on jury decisions on the insanity issue. The jury's
acceptance of lay opinion testimony in this area severely cripples
the potential of expert testimony, creates a major obstacle for the
defendant's assertion of insanity, and is perhaps the greatest
weakness of the insanity defense.
Burdens of Proof in the Insanity Defense and the Redmond
Standard
The difficulties in applying the insanity defense in Illinois have
been increased by recent case law that made significant changes
in the defendant's burden of raising the issue of insanity at trial
30. People v. Ford, 39 Ill.2d 318, 235 N.E.2d 576 (1968); and People v. Banks, 17
Ill.App.3d 746, 308 N.E.2d 261 (1st Dist. 1974) are excellent examples of this. In both
cases, the defendants had long histories of mental and emotional illness and several
experts and lay persons testified for the defense that the defendant was insane. In each
case, police officers (in Banks only one officer) testified for the prosecution that the
defendant acted normally a short period of time after the crime and that the defendant
was sane. In both cases, the convictions were affirmed.
31. People v. Ehrler, 114 Ill.App.2d 171, 184, 252 N.E.2d 227, 233 (2nd Dist. 1969) (the
adoption of the phrase "mental disease or mental defect" was intended to conform the
language of the statute to terms "more congenial to modern psychiatry").
32. Neither defense nor prosecution is required to provide expert testimony in order to
satisfy its burden of proof. People v. Redmond, 59 Ill.2d 328, 320 N.E.2d 321 (1974); People
v. Smothers, 55 Ill.2d 172, 302 N.E.2d 324 (1973); People v. Childs, 51 Ill.2d 247, 281
N.E.2d 631 (1972); People v. Horton, 29 Ill.App.3d 704, 331 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1975).
See notes 33-44 and accompanying text infra. This position was reaffirmed most recently
in People v. Greenfield, 30 Ill.App.3d 1044, 1048, 333 N.E.2d 36, 40 (4th Dist. 1975). The
court, relying upon prior decisions, still held that in rebuttal the state need not introduce
expert opinion evidence. In Greenfield, the state brought out in rebuttal the lay opinion
of the victim.
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and the prosecution's corresponding burden of rebutting the de-
fense. Three Illinois Supreme Court decisions have been of partic-
ular significance: People v. Childs," People v. Smothers,3' and
the current leading case in the area, People v. Redmond. 5
The Childs decision, in 1972, held that if the defense provided
"some evidence" which raised "a doubt" concerning sanity, then
the prosecution was required to prove the defendant sane "be-
yond a reasonable doubt."3 Psychiatric testimony was not re-
quired to raise the issue of defendant's insanity at the time of
commission of the crime. 7 The defendant's burden in Childs was
satisfied by a showing that he had previously spent years in a
mental institution, escaped, and had been diagnosed as para-
noiac even though no recent evidence of insanity was presented.
One year later, the procedural rule was modified in favor of the
prosecution by the Smothers decision which required the defen-
dant to raise not merely "a doubt" but rather "a reasonable
doubt" of sanity at the time of the crime."8 Evidence of irrational
and bizarre conduct, standing alone, was held insufficient to sat-
isfy the defendant's burden. The Childs case was distinguished
on the grounds that in Childs evidence of both prior irrational
conduct and prior mental treatment had been presented. 0
Redmond, in 1974, appeared to impose higher burdens on both
parties to the litigation by holding that the defendant must estab-
lish a reasonable doubt of sanity." Once the defendant challenges
the presumption of sanity, it follows logically that the prosecution
cannot obtain a conviction unless it effectively rebuts defend-
ant's evidence.' 2 In Redmond the court held that the defense
33. 51 Ill.2d 247, 281 N.E.2d 631 (1972).
34. 55 Ill.2d 172, 302 N.E.2d 324 (1973).
35. 59 1Il.2d 328, 320 N.E.2d 321 (1974).
36. 51 Ill.2d 247, 256, 281 N.E.2d 631, 635 (1972).
37. Id. at 257, 281 N.E.2d at 636.
38. 55 l.2d 172, 174, 302 N.E.2d 324, 326 (1973).
39. Id. at 175, 302 N.E.2d at 326.
40. Id.
41. 59 Ill.2d 328, 338, 320 N.E.2d 321, 326 (1974).
42. Prior to the Redmond decision, the state was not required to provide rebuttal
testimony. As one reviewing court stated:
When the presumption of sanity has been overcome the question of a defen-
dant's sanity or insanity is to be determined from the whole evidence, without
reference to the presumption.
People v. Lono, 11 Ill.App.3d 443, 449, 297 N.E.2d 349, 354 (1st Dist. 1973).
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failed to satisfy its burden despite defense testimony by the police
officer that the accused did not "act quite normal," by another
witness that the accused "lost his mind" at the time of the of-
fense, and by the defendant that he heard "voices and spirits."43
The court found that the defense had presented "some evidence"
but had not raised a "reasonable doubt."
As a result of these decisions, the insanity defense in Illinois
now imposes a high burden of proof upon both defense and prose-
cution. An initial presumption of sanity operates to prevent the
issue from reaching the trier of fact unless the defendant raises
"a reasonable doubt" of sanity. Once the presumption is over-
come, however, the state faces a directed verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity unless it provides rebuttal evidence sufficient
to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt."
Thus, while legal theory on the insanity defense has progressed
considerably in the last two decades,45 the realistic problems of
its application in Illinois have remained. The conflict in terminol-
ogy between the professions, the failure of reviewing courts to
provide adequate definitional guidance, the lack of available ex-
perts, and the heavy reliance upon the layman witness and juror
have negated the advances in theory. A final shortcoming of the
current insanity defense in Illinois is apparent from the public
perspective. Newspapers reflect society's fear that a defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity and committed may be released
from a mental institution without judicial supervision or con-
trol." Recognition of these practical problems makes it clear that
proposals for change in the insanity defense are needed.
43. 13 Ill.App.3d 604, 607-08, 300 N.E.2d 786, 788-89 (1973).
44. But see People v. Horton, 29 Ill.App.3d 704, 331 N.E.2d 104 (1st Dist. 1975). The
defendant introduced a psychiatrist's testimony, and the state conceded that defendant
met his burden, but the state put nothing on in rebuttal. The court held that, "It is for
the trier of fact to determine from all the evidence whether the state had fulfilled its
burden." Id. at 710, 331 N.E.2d at 109. The court then went on to affirm the defendant's
conviction. The logic of the court's opinion is subject to question in light of Redmond,
which seems to require specific rebuttal on the insanity issue, not merely as here inciden-
tal testimony by the officer.
45. See note 2 supra.
46. See note 3 supra.
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PROPOSAL: "GUILTY, BUT INSANE"
Proposed Legislative and Judicial Changes
The shortcomings of the current law of criminal insanity in
Illinois may be remedied by removing the insanity issue from the
trial phase of the criminal process. First, the trial would result in
a determination as to whether the defendant committed the crim-
inal act. Then a post-trial hearing for the guilty defendant would
be held to determine whether the defendant's mental condition
at the time of the crime makes commitment to a mental institu-
tion more appropriate than sentence to a penitentiary.
Implementation of this proposal would necessitate action by
both the legislature and the courts. The first step would be the
deletion from the criminal statutes of the affirmative defense of
insanity and the insertion of a section stating that the question
of a defendant's sanity would no longer be part of the trier of
fact's determination of guilt or innocence. 7 The primary purpose
of this change is to remove the question of sanity from the jury
where most of the current practical problems are found." For
public policy reasons, the state would be relieved of the burden
of proving defendant's sanity in order to obtain a conviction and
would be required to prove only the factual circumstances of the
47. Present statutes dealing with competency to stand trial would not be affected.
48. Suggestions of other alternatives to the insanity defense only give the lay jury more
leeway in determining the insanity issue. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1036
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Wales, Analysis
of the Proposal to 'Abolish' the Insanity Defense in S.#1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA.
L. REv. 687, 710-11 (1976). By adding the concept of a "just verdict," for instance, there
is an additional factor for the jury to weigh in its insanity determination.
The State of Michigan has recently adopted "guilty but mentally ill" statutes noted
and discussed in Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471 (1976). The statutes require notice prior to trial of a possible
insanity defense. Four forms of verdicts are to be submitted to the jury: guilty, not guilty,
not guilty by reason of insanity, and guilty but mentally ill. In order to return the verdict
guilty but mentally ill, the jury must decide that 1) defendant was proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt, 2) defendant was mentally ill at the time of the crime, and 3) de-
fendant was not insane at the time of the crime. If the jury finds the defendant "guilty
but mentally ill," the defendant is sentenced and treated by either the corrections depart-
ment or the mental health department.
The great fault of the Michigan approach should be obvious-the determination of
sanity or mental illness is still left with the jury. In light of the fact that the jury already
is confused over insanity and easily rejects that defense, the availability of the insanity
defense is not helped by requiring the jury to make yet another determination.
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crime from which intent may usually be inferred.49
This proposal represents a major departure from the traditional
tests which emphasized that the defendant's insanity negated
either the mens rea or voluntariness needed to classify the pro-
hibited act as criminal. The current system requires the jury to
choose between a verdict of guilty or a verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity. A finding of guilt erroneously implies that the
defendant was capable of criminal intent or of conforming his
conduct to the requirements of law. Acquittal by reason of insan-
ity suggests no condemnation of the defendant's action. The pro-
posal rationalizes the adjudication process by limiting the role of
the jury to a determination of whether the accused committed the
acts charged and by reserving the question of proper disposition
of the guilty defendant to a post-trial hearing.5"
That section of the criminal statutes dealing with post-trial
motions could be amended to provide that a defendant who
wished to raise an insanity issue could do so within thirty days
of conviction and prior to sentencing. A hearing would be held,
without a jury, to consider both expert and lay testimony on the
issue of defendant's mental condition, applying the current statu-
tory definition of insanity. The defendant would have the burden
of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane
at the time of the offense. Following the insanity hearing, the trial
judge could be required by the statute to make explicit findings
of fact regarding the issue of defendant's sanity both at the time
of the act and at the time of the post-trial hearing.
After a pre-sentence report, and a further hearing in aggrava-
tion and mitigation, the defendant would be sentenced in accord-
ance with the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code. The
sentencing provisons"' would provide that if the defendant failed
49. Some authorities oppose the abolition of the insanity defense as irreconcilable with
the concept of mens rea. See, e.g., United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 985 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Fingarette, Disabilities of the Mind and Criminal Responsibility-A Unitary
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 236, 242 (1976). However, the practical advantages of abolish-
ing the current insanity defense outweigh the theoretical objections. See notes 57-58 and
accompanying text infra.
50. A recent study on juries and the insanity defense observed that "[i]n many instan-
ces the jury would have liked to declare the defendant guilty, but insane. That kind of
verdict would permit the jurors to condemn the defendant's behavior and at the same time
to grant him a special dispensation." R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY
178 (1967).
51. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§115-3, 115.4, 1005-2-4 (1975).
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to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane
at the time of the act, sentencing would follow normal procedures.
If the defendant demonstrated insanity at the time of the act and
at the hearing, the trial judge would order the defendant involun-
tarily committed to a state mental institution until sanity is re-
gained. If the court found hospitalization unnecessary, the court
could order release on bail or recognizance with strict provisions
that the defendant seek mental treatment, and the court could
impose any other requirement deemed appropriate.
To insure proper treatment of the defendant and to keep the
court abreast of the defendant's status, the court would periodi-
cally review the status of the defendant's mental condition sua
sponte or on motion of the defendant. The state's attorney of the
county where the defendant was convicted would have the right
to participate in this subsequent review and to offer evidence.
Similarly, a hearing would be held to consider defendant's peti-
tion for release from confinement. At such a hearing, both parties
would participate, present evidence, and the court would enter
new findings of fact. The defendant could not be released by the
Department of Mental Health; release would be through the
court alone.52
If the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
he was insane at the time of the act but is sane at the time of the
hearing, or has since become sane following commitment, the
52. Under current Illinois law, once a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity
and he is still insane, the court orders the defendant to be hospitalized and subsequent
care, treatment, review, and discharge take place under the Mental Health Code, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, §1005-2-4 (1975). The Mental Health Code, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 911/', §§1-1
et seq. (1975), does not distinguish between persons found not guilty by reason of insanity
and other persons who are committed. In contrast to the instant proposal, the Mental
Health Code permits such a person to be given an "absolute discharge" by the superin-
tendent of the hospital "at any time" with no prior notice or court approval required, ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 911/2, §10-4 (1975).
The results of the application of current Illinois law can be tragic. In a recent example,
a defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity was released by the treating hospital
four years after his trial for murder. A letter from a state psychiatrist noted that the
defendant might be subject to a recurrence of violent behavior if outside of institutional
care. Five months after the defendant was released from the hospital, the defendant beat
a security guard to death without any provocation. Both the state's attorney and the trial
judge noted that the action of the Department of Mental Health in releasing the defendant
from hospitalization without any notice to the court was "outrageous." The Department
of Mental Health and the releasing hospital each blamed the other for the release of the
defendant. Nicodemus & Rooney, Agencies Pass the Buck Over Release of a Killer, Chi.
Daily News, Oct. 29, 1976, at 4, col. 1.
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trial court would be allowed to impose a sentence of no less than
6 months nor more than 2 years or provide for a special condi-
tional discharge. The court could impose such reasonable restric-
tions upon the defendant as it deems necessary to insure the
health of the defendant, his continued supervision by responsible
persons, and the protection of society. Such restrictions may in-
clude but would not be limited to: required medical treatment for
defendant, periodic reporting to the court, and supervision and
guidance of defendant by responsible persons. At termination of
the period of the special conditional discharge, if the defendant
has fulfilled the required restrictions, the trial court would dis-
charge the defendant.53 Penalties for violation of the conditional
discharge of course would be necessary.54
All orders of the trial court pertaining to sentencing and invol-
untary commitment under these proposals would be appealable
by the defendant or the state to the appellate court as a matter
of right and to the supreme court upon petition. These appeal
provisions will insure that the proper checks are placed upon the
system and will provide for unusual or unanticipated situations.
A supreme court rule could establish a procedure for speedy dis-
position of such appeals in the appellate court.55
Finally, it would be advantageous for the supreme court to
provide for a special committee of the Illinois Judicial Confer-
ence5" to consider legal issues relating to criminal insanity. The
committee would convene at regular intervals to review the status
of the mental health facilities and their standard of care, study
and review the latest medically accepted concepts of psychiatry
and psychology, and work towards establishing judicial standards
for interpretation of the insanity test.
53. Such a period of special conditional discharge has two significant advantages: it
allows for the protection of society by minimal restrictions upon the now sane defendant,
and it helps the defendant in his readjustment to society by providing guidance and any
further treatment necessary.
54. A reasonable penalty could be a sentence of confinement to the local department
of corrections for six months or the remaining period of the conditional discharge, which-
ever is greater. The sentencing judge would make recommendations to the department
concerning supervision and treatment of the defendant while so confined.
55. The insanity appeal would be treated separately from defendant's appeal of the jury
conviction.
56. See ILL. Sup. CT. R. 41.
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Advantages
The proposed changes would offer significant advantages to the
jury, the public, the medical profession, and the defendant. Ju-
ries would no longer have to evaluate the conflicting testimony of
experts for the prosecution and defense, or apply statutory stan-
dards which even the experts cannot deal with adequately. More
importantly, juries that believed that the defendant committed
the act charged would be permitted to return a verdict of guilty
rather than a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. The
public would be assured that the dangerous mentally ill defen-
dant would be confined and treated, and could not be released
without express court findings that the individual no longer pre-
sented a danger to society.
Medical experts would be accorded greater latitude in giving
answers and explaining reasons for their opinions on the medical
condition of the defendant. They would not be expected to state
opinions on the essentially moral question of the defendant's re-
sponsibility for the acts charged. Strict rules of evidence, includ-
ing those disallowing hearsay, leading questions, and explanatory
answers, could be relaxed since there would be no danger of preju-
dice to a jury. While, of course, the expert would be subject to
cross-examination, it would no longer be necessary for opposing
counsel to attack the expert's credibility before the jury.
The resentment of each profession for the other would also be
lessened. Attorneys would no longer need to be skeptical of the
psychiatrist's "scientificness" and possible influence on the
jury,5" and could concentrate instead on the medical diagnosis
and its supporting facts. The expert would be cast more in the
role of an advisor to the parties and the court rather than in the
role of a biased witness. The new role should be more acceptable
to the medical profession."
57. The bar also harbors resentment against the medical expert. The adversary system
is the lawyer's institution and he expresses distrust of any interference with it. Lawyers
fear the expert, who with his detailed knowledge may virtually dictate to the jury the
outcome of the case. See CRIMINAL INSANITY, supra note 11, at 83. "Each specialty casts
the others as scapegoats." Fingarette, Disabilities of the Mind and Criminal Responsibil-
ity-A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 236, 237 (1976).
58. Other proposals for abolishing the insanity defense and placing the decision at the
dispositional phase seem to rely too strongly on a panel of experts and to ignore the facts
of the crime, which are important. See, e.g., Fingarette, Disabilities of the Mind and
Criminal Responsibility-A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 236, 242 (1976). The
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Advantages to the defendant under the proposed system in-
clude the probable availability of a larger number of experts will-
ing to testify in criminal proceedings and the improved
understanding of judges of medical issues and medical testimony.
In addition, a criminally insane or dangerous defendant would
more certainly be confined to a state mental institution where he
would receive better treatment than if he were sent to prison.
Finally, the defendant who is granted a conditional discharge has
an improved chance of making a successful transition into so-
ciety.
Disadvantages
The primary disadvantage of the proposed system, from the
perspective of the defendant, is the increase in the burden of
proof. Rather than merely having to raise a reasonable doubt in
the minds of the jurors, as in the present system, the defendant
would have to prove insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
before a judge.59 This additional burden, however, is balanced by
the advantages accruing to the defendant under the new system
and is justified by the need to provide improved protection of
society.
A defendant might argue violation of double jeopardy or due
process. Conviction of a defendant who did not have the ability
to harbor criminal intent, because of insanity, violates traditional
concepts of mens rea. In addition, a possibility exists that an
appellate court reviewing the rulings of the trial court might re-
verse the finding of insanity and impose a higher sentence 0
These constitutional challenges can be met however. In North
instant proposal, however, does not place heavy reliance upon the expert but merely allows
the expert a proper role, that of advisor to the court, without having to state a conclusion
on responsibility. The facts of the crime itself are also placed in their proper perspective
since the trial court has heard the facts recently and can consider them.
59. There is, of course, no constitutional problem here. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790
(1952) (Oregon statute which placed the burden of proving insanity beyond a resonable
doubt on defendant is not violative of due process). Twenty-two states currently place the
burden of proving insanity by a preponderance of the evidence upon the defendant. Com-
ment, Constitutional Limitations on Allocating the Burden of Proof of Insanity to the
Defendant in Murder Cases, 56 B.U.L. REv. 499, 503 (1976). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 705 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
60. Defendant's sentence, however, may actually be shorter with a definite sentence of
confinement as compared to indefinite confinement in a mental institution.
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Carolina v. Pearce,"' the United States Supreme Court found no
constitutional prohibition to imposition of a more severe sentence
upon the reconviction of a defendant.2 The Supreme Court re-
jected arguments based on due process and double jeopardy. 3
CONCLUSION
A recent case exemplifies that the Illinois reviewing courts may
be receptive to change in the law of insanity. In People v. Dread,4
the appellate court noted several criticisms of the jury's determi-
nation of the insanity issue. The court stated, "It is obvious that
a re-examination of the procedural aspect of the insanity issue is
timely." The court later stated that "some thought could be given
to the possibility" of "a post-conviction examination, evaluation
and resolution of this question [the insanity issue] outside the
inherent conflicts of resolving the innocence or guilt issue in the
criminal trial."6 5
The current Illinois law on criminal insanity poses major prac-
tical problems for the defendant, the expert witness, and the jury.
In addition, the public is dissatisfied with a system that permits
nonjudicial release of dangerous offenders. These problems can be
61. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
62. Id. at 723.
63. In his attack upon Senate Bill 1, the revision of the federal criminal code which also
proposed abolition of the insanity defense, Wales notes that abolition of the insanity
defense may be constitutionally questionable on due process grounds, or alternately that
the courts will expand the mens rea element of the crime. Wales, Analysis of the Proposal
to 'Abolish' the Insanity Defense in S.#1: Squeezing a Lemon, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 687
(1976). This argument and the entire article are partially based upon the assumption that
the question of insanity is dominated by expert opinion and that retention of the insanity
defense is of benefit to the accused. Due to the practical problems involved in the insanity
defense, however, these assumptions are false. The insanity defense is dominated by the
lay witness, not the expert. By removing the lay jury, the lay opinion witness, and taking
insanity out of the guilt-innocence determination, the accused benefits.
The court in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), considered the
possible abolition of the insanity defense but rejected doing it by judicial fiat. The court
noted, however, that the legislature would be the appropriate body for consideration of
abolition. Strict liability has been imposed by statute for some crimes, thus removing the
intent element altogether. As previously noted, the proposal herein contemplates both
judicial and legislative action.
While doubts as to the constitutionality of this proposal do arise, they are not per se
prohibitive of it. The abolition of the insanity defense coupled with the dispositional
proceeding may withstand the due process challenge.
64. 27 Ill.App.3d 106, 327 N.E.2d 175 (1st Dist. 1975).
65. Id. at 114-15, 327 N.E.2d at 181.
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resolved most adequately by removing the insanity issue from the
trial jury and instituting a post-trial hearing to consider the pro-
per disposition of the convicted defendant. This post-trial hearing
would solve many of the problems currently faced by the defen-
dant who wishes to assert insanity. It would allow the defendant
greater availability of expert witnesses and would decrease the
impact of lay witnesses. In a bench decision of insanity, the de-
fendant would be adjudged by the flexible Illinois statutory for-
mula for insanity rather than the harsher standard of the jury's
common understanding of knowing right from wrong. Judicial
release would also protect society against premature release of
dangerous offenders. Implementation of all or most of the propos-
als discussed herein would offer significant advancements over
the present system in Illinois.
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